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Zoning for the Regional Welfare
Municipal zoning has been justified in economic terms as a tool
with which municipalities can correct for failures in the housing and
public service markets.' The economic assumptions that underlie zon-
ing deviate significantly from the real world situation, however, and
municipalities often use their zoning power to regulate the allocation
of developable resources in pursuit of other, parochial goals. Further-
more, because of the narrow scope of state enabling legislation 2 and
because of restrictive judicial interpretations of the legisIation,
3 mu-
nicipalities are permitted to ignore the impact of their zoning activities
upon the greater region of which they are a part.4 Such zoning leads
to the inefficient use of resources in the production of housing.
This Note argues that to ensure economic efficiency in housing
development, legislative intervention is required that would define
1. See, e.g., Davis, Economic Elements in Municipal Zoning Decisions, 39 LAND ECON.
375, 375-76 (1963) (zoning regulations necessary to eliminate external diseconomies that
result from unconstrained juxtaposition of land uses); Hamilton, Property Taxes and
the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some Empirical Evidence, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CON-
TROLs 13, 14-15 (E. Mills & W. Oates, eds. 1975) (zoning necessary to eliminate free riders
from consumption of public services financed through local property taxes).
2. The model law upon which most state enabling legislation has been based, see U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr § I (rev. ed. 1926), re-
printed in C. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 547 (2d ed. 1949) [herein-
after cited as STANDARD ENABLING ACT], specifically restricts the scope of the general wel-
fare to that "of the [zoning] community." See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 414.1 (West 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1976).
3. See note 47 infra (federal courts); p. 760 infra (state courts).
4. The definition of a specific region and the delineation of its boundaries are not
easy tasks, for spillover effects upon further geographic areas are inevitable. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, for example, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), noted
that no rule could be established for the definition of a region, the composition of which
would vary from one situation to another. 67 N.J. at 189, 336 A.2d at 733. The New
Jersey Supreme Court has presented a detailed discussion of the empirical problem of
defining such a region. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J.
481, 536-41, 371 A.2d 1192, 1219-22 (1977).
Nonetheless, some restrictive concept is necessary, and since at some point the zoning
effects of a single municipality become de minimis, an acceptable definition of a region
may be made. Generally the regions of concern in zoning cases are metropolitan areas
surrounding a central city, especially including the suburbs that face rapid development
and population growth. Some discussions have utilized the concept of the Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) developed by the Office of Management and Budget
as the region relevant to housing development and zoning concerns. See, e.g., Urban
League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 21, 359 A.2d
526, 532 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), pet. for certification denied, 74 N.J. 262 (1977);
Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1644-46 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Developments-Zoning]. This definition of a region will underlie the discussion in this
Note.
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the applicable general welfare as that of the whole region that shares
population growth and developmental concerns with a given zoning
municipality. The Note proposes a means of zoning regulation based
upon the concept of "fair share" allocation of land uses among the
municipalities of a region5 in order to guarantee that sufficient land
is made available for all uses and that distributive social goals are
furthered. The proposal allows for modification of the strict redistribu-
tive effects of the "fair share" allocation, however, by permitting mu-
nicipalities to purchase or trade among themselves the right to develop
the various uses. In this manner, the distributive goals can be modified
to include other efficiency considerations without allowing municipal-
ities to decrease the total amount of land that is supplied for each use
in the region.
I. Economic Aspects of Zoning
From its inception, zoning has been used as a method for dealing
with the problems of land use faced by a rapidly urbanizing society.6
Underlying the legitimation of the zoning power is a theory of market
failure in the housing and public services markets absent municipal
zoning. This theory, however, is based upon several premises that are
themselves open to question.
A. The Economic Theory of Zoning
Given several assumptions concerning the behavior of consumers,
producers, and markets, 7 a competitive market at equilibrium will
attain a Pareto optimal allocation of resources and goods.8 Without
5. The concept of "fair share" allocation of uses among municipalities in a given
region was developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174, 336 A.2d 713, 724, appeal dismissed,
423 U.S. 808 (1975). In that case, as in most challenges to municipal zoning activities, the
restricted use was low-income housing. This Note will focus upon low-income housing
as the most significant "undesirable" use, because its development is the most con-
troversial and crucial in the long-term planning for urban regions.
6. R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.13 (1968).
7. The assumptions are that consumers seek to maximize utility and producers to
maximize profits, that production and utility functions are convex, that inputs and out-
puts are homogeneous and divisible, that conditions of universality of markets and exact
knowledge obtain, and that there are no transaction costs. W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 557 (2d ed. 1978); Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351,
353-56 (1958).
8. A Pareto optimal allocation is one at which no reallocation of goods among con-
sumers could enhance the welfare of one consumer without making another worse off.
W. NICHOLSON, supra note 7, at 518. For a discussion of the relationship between Pareto
optimality and competitive equilibrium, see id. at 555-64; Scherer, General Equilibrium
and Economic Efficiency, 10 Am. ECONOMIST 1, 14-16 (1966).
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interference, a competitive market causes producers to use the avail-
able resources to produce the greatest possible amount of goods desired
by consumers, and those goods are divided among consumers such that
no consumer's utility may be increased without decreasing that of
another.9 A necessary aspect of the competitive market is its pricing
mechanism, which provides the information and incentives necessary
to ensure that the economic actors produce and consume the proper
amount of goods.' 0 In the housing and public service markets, how-
ever, several of the assumptions necessary for the proper functioning
of a competitive pricing mechanism are violated, so that individuals
fail to act in a manner necessary to bring about a Pareto optimal use
of resources."
1. The Problem of Externalities
Early land use law recognized that some property uses impose costs
upon neighboring property owners. 12 These added neighborhood costs
are not considered by the offending use, so that its production costs
are less than the actual social cost resulting from the activity.13 In this
way the pricing mechanism, which forces the producer to recover only
those costs that have been internalized, encourages over-production of
the offending use and forces neighboring property owners to bear its
uncaptured external costs.
The common law dealt with this problem in an ad hoc fashion,
determining in each case whether to enjoin a challenged use because
it constituted a "nuisance" to its neighbors." Early in the twentieth
century, however, rapid urbanization juxtaposed myriad property
uses, many of which imposed costs on others in surrounding areas.
Determining the costs imposed and borne in each case would be im-
possible. Thus emerged the concept of comprehensive zoning, defined
9. Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AM. EcoN. REv. 22, 31-34
(1957); Scherer, supra note 8, at 4, 7.
10. For a general discussion of how the price mechanism operates and its significance,
see R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKErS 196-226 (3d ed. 1978); W. NICHOLSON, supra note 7,
at 555-64.
11. The manner in which failures of the pricing mechanism result in the failure of
an economy to attain a Pareto optimum is discussed in W. NicHoLsoN, supra note 7, at
566-71.
12. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at § 2.03.
13. W. NICHOLSON, supra note 7, at 568-71 ("The price system can also fail to allocate
resources efficiently when there are interactions among firms and individuals that are
not adequately reflected in market prices.")
14. R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at § 2.03; Mills, Economic Analysis of Urban Land-Use
Controls, in CURRENT ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS 511, 514-15 (P. Mieszkowski & M.
Straszheim, eds. 1979).
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as the division of a municipality into districts, each specified for
development of only certain uses. 16 Municipal governments hoped
that the segregation of uses would alleviate the externalities; it was
assumed that each use imposed no costs upon the same or similar uses
and that external effects declined with increasing distance from an
offending use.16
2. The Elimination of Free Riders
Another justification for zoning derives from the fact that many
municipal services are financed through property taxes. 17 With no con-
15. R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at §§ 1.12-.13; Developments-Zoning, supra note 4, at
1429. Zoning developed initially from some of the concepts of the common law of
nuisance, and from the recognition that the problem of externalities was the crucial factor
in the definition of nuisances. R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at § 2.03; Heyman & Gilhool,
The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents
Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1122-23 (1964). Rather than ban
offending uses, many of which are integral to the expanding industrial society, zoning
regulations restrict the areas available for their use, limiting their inimical effects upon
neighbors.
The most common justification for zoning is that it "prevent[s] offensive uses of land
that impose external costs on neighbors." Maser, Riker, & Rosett, The Effects of Zoning
and Externalities on the Price of Land: An Empirical Analysis of Monroe County, New
York, 20 J. LAW & ECON. 111, 112 (1977). Zoning was meant to encourage the market
tendency toward specialization of land use and the positive externalities that develop
from that trend. Id.
From its inception, however, zoning also has been used for motives other than those
of organizing urbanization and controlling externalities. For example, one of the earliest
municipal restrictions on property use occurred in the 1880s, when the government of
San Francisco limited the areas in which laundries could be built. This act was seen as
an attempt to confine Chinese inhabitants to small areas of the city. Mills, supra note
14, at 515.
16. Because of these assumptions, zoning, when first established and to a great extent
today, was "cumulative" or "hierarchical"; that is, in districts zoned for the least intensive
use (large-lot single family homes) no other uses could be developed, but in each district
at a lower step in the hierarchy both the use for which it was zoned plus all less intensive
uses were permitted. At the lowest step in the hierarchy (usually heavy industry) any use
was allowed. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 381 (1926); Develop-
ments-Zoning, supra note 4, at 1429. This hierarchical approach reflected the nuisance
and externality foundations of zoning, for it was believed that nonreciprocal costs were
imposed upon less intensive uses by their more intensive neighbors. Thus, zoning pro-
tected the less intensive uses and left the more intensive ones "no worse off than before
zoning." R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 127-28 (1966).
This is different from the concept of "selective" or "noncumulative" zoning, which
requires that in each district only that use for which it is zoned be developed. The trend
has been in favor of this type of zoning, for external costs have been found to be imposed
upon all types of uses, not just upon those considered less intensive in the hierarchical
model. R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at § 8.15; Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The
State and Local Programs, 50 IowA L. REv. 367, 386-88 (1965).
17. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12
URB. STUD. 205, 205-07 (1975). The New Jersey Supreme Court has noted, "Th[e] policy
of land use regulation for a fiscal end derives from New Jersey's tax structure, which has
imposed on local real estate most of the cost of municipal and county government and
The Yale Law Journal
straints, newcomers could build low-value homes from which the local
government would receive insufficient tax revenues to defray the costs
of supplying services to the new households. The nonexclusive nature
of many public services would allow new recipients to become free
riders upon those residents already financing the supply of the
services.'
8
Zoning, according to this justification, is an appropriate municipal
response to the free-rider problem.' 9 A municipality can zone carefully
to help guarantee that home values yield property tax revenues suf-
ficient to cover the cost of supplying services. In addition, effective
zoning of this sort prevents the redistribution of income from old
residents to new that would occur in an unconstrained public service
market.
20
B. Defects in the Model
Some of the premises necessary for zoning to effect the reduction of
externalities and elimination of free riders do not comport with the
real world, and municipalities that justify zoning according to these
goals may in fact be serving other, parochial financial policies..
2'
of the primary and secondary education of the municipality's children." Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 171, 336 A.2d 713,
723, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
Some commentators have argued that replacement of the property tax by a per capita
taxation scheme would serve the municipal fiscal needs more efficiently. W. OATES, FISCAL
FEDERALISM 128-31 (1972); Mills, supra note 14, at 537-38. Tradition and state constitutional
restrictions render the adoption of such an alternative financial scheme unlikely.
18. The free-rider problem attends any public good because of its nonexclusive nature;
it is difficult to restrict persons from utilizing a public good (such as police protection,
parks, or clean air) once it is provided, even if the recipients do not pay for it. W.
NICHOLSON, supra note 7, at 571; Note, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Economics
of Serrano and Shaw, 82 YALE L.J. 89, 93-95 (1972). Many municipal services are not pure
public goods, for additional costs are incurred when they are utilized by increasing
numbers of persons. In this case the difficulty arises in the attempt to attribute to new-
comers the incremental cost of supplying services to them. Thus the free-rider problem
is a subset of the problem of externalities. Because of the distinctions between free riders
and other externalities, however, they are separately discussed in this Note.
19. See Mills, supra note 14, at 534 ("Land-use controls are necessary to exclude free
riders only because of reliance on property taxes to finance local government"); Hamilton,
suPra note 1, at 14-15 (same).
20. See White, Fiscal Zoning in Fragmented Metropolitan Areas, in FISCAL ZONING AND
LAND USE CONTROLS 31, 36-37 (E. Mills & W. Oates, eds. 1975) (properly functioning neutral
zoning helps eliminate possibility of income redistribution from old residents to new-
comers); Hamilton, supra note 17, at 206-07 (properly enacted fiscal zoning enables local
property taxes to function as prices for municipally supplied public goods; no redistribu-
tive effect is felt). The presence of newcomers who behave as free riders forces old
residents to pay the incremental costs incurred in supplying services to the newcomers.
This has the effect of reducing the income of the old residents and raising that of the
free riders, thus redistributing income between the groups.
21. For empirical studies questioning the value of zoning in dealing with the cx-
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1. The Free-Rider Problem
The argument that zoning eliminates free riders from the consump-
tion of municipally supplied public services derives from the hypothesis
of Charles Tiebout.2 2 He argued that, given certain assumptions,
23
household locational decisions are determined solely by shopping for
the bundle of public services that gives the household the greatest
utility.2 4 In a region of various jurisdictions offering different bundles
of services at corresponding tax rates, a household chooses the jurisdic-
tion that offers the bundle giving the household the greatest satisfac-
tion attainable given its budget constraint.2 5 Theoretically, therefore,
municipalities are homogeneous according to residential property
values.
26
This model relies upon several assumptions. First, households are
expected to have perfect interjurisdictional mobility; that is, they can
relocate, at no cost, in the municipality that offers the bundle of public
services they desire and can afford.2 7 This, of course, is not true.
28
Second, the model assumes that households' locational decisions are
determined solely by their choices of municipal public services. In fact,
however, exogenous considerations, such as proximity to employment
centers, access to the central city and transportation networks, and
ternality problem, and whether the problem exists at all as perceived, see Davis, supra
note 1, at 385 ("the democratic process may not always impose those constraints which
simply result in the elimination of external diseconomies in the pricing system in urban
property"); Maser, Riker, & Rosett, supra note 15, at 128 (zoning externalities trivial,
supporting principal finding that "zoning is ineffective"); cf. Rueter, Externalities in
Urban Property Markets: An Empirical Test of the Zoning Ordinance of Pittsburgh, 16
J. LAiw & EcoN. 313, 336-37 (1973) (although zoning can serve worthwhile purposes, "there
is little likelihood that all of the external effects anticipated by the zoning ordinance
actually arise in urban property markets").
22. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLITICAL ECON. 416 (1956).
23. These assumptions are discussed below.
24. Tiebout, supra note 22, at 418, 422.
25. Id. at 418; Hamilton, supra note 17, at 206 ("Households have no locational
preference per se; they locate so as to maximise [their utility].")
26. See Hamilton, supra note 17, at 206 ("every household in a given community con-
sumes the same amount of housing"). Professor Hamilton's empirical results challenge
this conclusion, however. See Hamilton, Mills, & Puryear, The Tiebout Hypothesis and
Residential Income Segregation, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 101, 113-14
(E. Mills 9- W. Oates, eds. 1975). Homogeneity of property values in turn correlates
with homogeneity by personal income level. See id. at 108-09; Mills & Oates, The Theory
of Local Public Services and Finance: Its Relevance to Urban Fiscal and Zoning Behavior,
in id., at 1, 5.
27. Tiebout, supra note 22, at 419, 422.
28. Tiebout recognizes the importance of this assumption and that it is not duplicated
in the real world. Id. at 421-22; cf. Hamilton, Mills, & Puryear, supra note 26, at 102-03
(interjurisdictional mobility limited, so presumption that equilibrium may be attained in
public services market weaker than in most markets).
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environmental and topographic factors, all play a significant role in
such choices as well.
2 9
Most importantly, the model assumes that within a region there
exists a sufficiently large number of jurisdictions offering different
bundles of services at different tax rates. 3° Such diversity does not
exist. The number of jurisdictions, and therefore the number of
available bundles of services, in most regions is limited,31 and not all
persons can find satisfactory affordable housing. This is especially true
of low-income households: municipalities supplying services at a tax
level that the poor can afford seldom exist. Even when they do, it could
be argued that income should not be the sole determinant of the
amount or quality of public services a household receives. Some ser-
vices are considered so necessary or fundamental that they should be
available regardless of the ability to pay.32
The result of these conditions is that in contrast to the conclusions
derived from the Tiebout theory, a large number of households in a
given region will be unable to find satisfactory housing. This is because
each municipality has an incentive to restrict the development of
uses, such as low-income housing, that constitute free riders. Zoning
municipalities thus avail themselves of the market failure to restrict
the supply of developable land for such uses to a level too low to
satisfy regional demand.
2. Municipal Market Power
The developable land of a given municipality is not fungible with
land in other jurisdictions. Because of various characteristics of the
land itself, the location of the municipality, or the services it offers, the
demand for its land is not fully elastic. 33 Homeowning residents of
29. Hamilton, Mills, & Puryear, supra note 26, at 103.
30. Tiebout, supra note 22, at 419.
31. Hamilton, Mills, & Puryear, supra note 26, at 103; Mills, supra note 14, at 534.
32. Most prominent among these is the right to primary education. See, e.g., Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1971) ("the
right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be
conditioned on wealth"); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 648-49, 376 A.2d 359, 374
(1977) (elementary and secondary education a fundamental right, equal enjoyment of
which is guaranteed to every pupil). But cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973) (education not a fundamental federal right).
A related argument could be made, protesting the municipal homogeneity that results
from zoning according to the Tiebout model, because it sacrifices the social goals of in-
tegration and redistribution of wealth. The Tiebout model can accommodate such goals
if they are conceived as components of the bundles of goods that constitute the utility
functions of households making locational choices. The proposal in this Note explicitly
includes these goals among the objectives to be satisfied by zoning. See p. 765 infra.
33. White, supra note 20, at 42.
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a municipality can use the zoning power to take advantage of its market
position, much as a monopolist does in a private market.34 These
residents' primary economic considerations are the improvement of
the value of their homes and the limitation of the taxes they must pay
for municipal services.35 The municipal government, representing the
homeowning electorate,36 thus will use the zoning power to restrict the
land available for development of new homes, since the reduction of
supply, given constant demand, will result in an increase in the value
of the existing housing stock.3 7 Also, zoning to require construction of
expensive large-lot homes guarantees that newcomers who move into
the homes will pay substantial property taxes. If the tax revenues
received are greater than the pro rata cost of supplying public services
to the new households, then the zoning results in a redistribution of
wealth from the new residents to the municipality.38
Additionally, this type of zoning forces other municipalities in the
region to bear the burden of supplying land for those uses restricted
34. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE
L.J. 385, 430-35 (1977); Hamilton, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power, 5 J.
URB. ECON. 116, 119-22 (1978).
35. These conclusions follow from the assumptions that producers or suppliers strive
to maximize their profits and consumers strive to maximize utility. See note 7 suPra. The
discussion in Ellickson, supra note 34, at 400-01, on the distributional effects of municipal
growth controls implies the existence of these motivations on the part of homeowners.
36. The argument that a suburban municipal government will represent its resident
homeowning electorate is based upon several assumptions. First, early in the development
of a municipality, as it changes from a rural area, resident homeowners become a
majority of its inhabitants. Then, assuming that the politics of a municipality obey a
majoritarian model, the concerns and viewpoint of the homeowning majority will there-
after dominate the considerations and behavior of the elected officials. Ellickson presents
a majoritarian model of suburban politics in which local officials, striving to be reelected,
work to maximize the satisfaction of the median voter. When homeowners constitute a
majority of the voters in a municipality, a common occurrence in developing com-
munities, their interests will be represented in government as those of the community as
a whole. Ellickson, supra note 34, at 404-07.
37. For a graphical presentation of this argument, see D. ERvIN, J. FITcH, R. GODWIN,
W. SHEPARD, & H. STOEVENER, LAND USE CocRoL 88-89 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LAND
USE CONTROL].
Such restrictive zoning could work to the financial disadvantage of owners of the existing
housing stock if the restrictions forestalled development of moderate-income housing whose
collective tax payments would be greater than that of large-lot homes. This possibility
would arise when a lot zoned for a single home could be subdivided for development of
several residences whose total taxable value was greater than that of a single large-lot
home. When this occurs, the owners of existing homes must weigh the benefits of restric-
tions against the costs of tax revenues foregone. When lower-income housing is the use
whose development is restricted, the costs decline in significance, since the tax revenues
obtainable from such housing are small. In fact, they may not suffice to defray the costs
incurred in supplying municipal services to the residents, which raises the free rider issue,
discussed at pp. 753-54 supra.
38. White, supra note 20, at 37-38, 43.
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or banned from the zoning municipality. 9 In this manner the restric-
tive municipality itself becomes a free rider upon other communities
in the region. It shares the benefit of other municipalities' supplying
land and services for the uses it bans, in that the supply elsewhere
reduces the pressures upon it to supply land for the unwanted uses,
and in that its residents gain utility from the knowledge that regional
needs for unwanted uses are somewhere satisfied.40 The restrictive
municipality, however, bears none of the costs incurred in the develop-
ment of the unwanted uses.
II. The Development of Zoning Law
A major cause of the diseconomies of zoning is the limited scope of
concerns upon which municipalities may focus when acting under the
zoning power. Although the economic problems purportedly addressed
by zoning and the effects of zoning actions are regional in scope,
municipalities traditionally have been required to consider only the
welfare of their own citizens when acting under the zoning power.
41
A. Traditional Government Attitudes Toward Zoning
Although the power to zone is one of the state government's police
powers, 42 every state has delegated that power to its municipal sub-
divisions.43 Most early state enabling acts specifically limited the
39. Ellickson, supra note 34, at 402-03.
40. This argument is based upon the assumption of the interdependence of consumers'
utility functions, which results in increased satisfaction to some consumers when in-
creased amounts of goods are distributed to others. See p. 765 infra.
41. For discussions of the limited value of the concept of municipal jurisdictions in
determining the effects of zoning, see Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices:
An Examination of the Current Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REv. 1111, 1141-42 (1972); Com-
ment, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1251
(1966). The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated:
The effective development of a region should not and cannot be made to depend
upon the adventitious location of municipal boundaries, often prescribed decades or
even centuries ago, and based in many instances on considerations of geography, of
commerce, or of politics that are no longer significant with respect to zoning.
Duffcon Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 513, 64 A.2d 347, 350 (1949).
42. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174, 336 A.2d 713,
725, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at §§ 3.01-.03.
43. On the delegation of the right to zone under the police power, see R. ANDERSON,
supra note 6, at § 3.09. Under the police power, local jurisdictions may regulate the
activities of citizens for the purpose of protecting their health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. Id. at § 2.06.
Some state constitutions grant municipalities home-rule powers that have been in-
terpreted to include the right to zone, independent of the power delegated by the state
legislature through enabling acts. See, e.g., CALIF. CONsT. art. XI, § 7; OHIO CoNsT. art.
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zoning power to actions "promoting health, safety, morals, or the gen-
eral welfare of the community."
44
1. The Federal Judiciary and Zoning
The federal courts became involved early in constitutional challenges
to municipal use of the zoning power. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,45 the Supreme Court in 1926 upheld against a due process
challenge46 a municipality's right to zone under the police power.
47
Euclid established a presumption of legality for the zoning power,
48
and for many years the Supreme Court all but refused to consider
challenges to exercises of the zoning authority.49 Recently the Court
XVIII, § 3. Such constitutionally granted zoning powers are limited, however, by the
specific requirements in the enabling act. R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at § 3.06.
The zoning power has been delegated to municipalities rather than retained and
exercised b; the state governments in the belief that land use regulation is primarily a
local concern. Id. at § 3.01.
44. STANDARD ENABLING Acr, supra note 2, at § 1.
The "welfare" on behalf of which municipalities may zone has been defined by the
courts over the years with a great degree of breadth. For example, in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Supreme Court stated that
[t]he police power [which is exercised, inter alia, to protect the "general welfare"]
is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
Id. at 9; cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) (aesthetic and "spiritual" con-
siderations part of concept of "public welfare"); R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at § 7.03
(court decisions "reveal an expanding judicial concept of the public welfare and a con-
sequent enlargement of the police power in relation to zoning ordinances").
45. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
46. The due process argument in Euclid was that zoning that reduced the value of
plaintiff's property deprived him of his liberty and property without due process of law,
as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 384.
47. Id. at 395. Two years later, in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the
Court found the challenged zoning ordinance to be unconstitutional, but only to the
extent that it deprived plaintiff of the use of his property for no rational purpose. The
constitutionality of the zoning power itself was not challenged, and Euclid was relied upon
for its support. Id. at 187-88. Nectow initiated a narrow geographic interpretation of the
community interests on behalf of which a municipality must zone, by limiting the scope
of inquiry to only that part of the city in which the plaintiff's land lay. Id. at 188; see
Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 118 (traditional
focus in determining parties in whose behalf municipality must zone restricted to
residents).
48. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (ordinance must
be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare" before declared unconstitutional); cf. Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[D]eference
should be given to governmental judgments concerning proper land-use allocation. That
deference is a principle which has served this Court well . . . . Our role is not and
should not be to sit as a zoning board of appeals.")
49. After Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Supreme Court did
not continue to play the role of scrutinizing individual zoning ordinances that seemed
to follow from its actions in that case. See Bigham & Bostick, supra note 41, at 1115.
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has reentered the field to adjudicate several cases in which specific
zoning ordinances were challenged because they allegedly violated
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.50 Neither the
legality of the exercise of the zoning power itself nor the economic
effects of the ordinances were challenged, yet the Court continued to
use the presumption of legality established in Euclid.51
The presumption of legality has developed with an attitude of
reluctance to intervene on the part of the federal judiciary. Federal
courts have supplied two reasons for their reluctance to become in-
Between the time of the Nectow decision and the early 1970s, the Court decided only one
minor zoning case. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116
(1928) (ordinance requiring consent of owners of property surrounding building before
building may be replaced by larger structure held violative of due process).
50. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ordinance restricting
type of family members who could cohabit apartment found to violate due process
guarantee of liberty); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (refusal to rezone for low-income housing project alleged to violate equal
protection guarantee). The lower federal courts have adjudicated numerous similar cases.
See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508
F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v.
City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
51. The presumption of legality established in Euclid for cases challenging the
economic effects of zoning is of questionable applicability in cases involving alleged in-
fringements of fundamental rights, which typically require stricter scrutiny of the
governmental activity. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (state im-
pairment of right to vote subject to strict judicial scrutiny); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) ("freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly,
and of worship . . . are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect"). Nonetheless, in Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), in which the complaint alleged that the local
regulation violated plaintiffs' rights of privacy and association, the Court upheld the
ordinance after a brief affirmance of an expansive concept of "general welfare" in behalf
of which a municipality may regulate behavior. See Williams & Doughty, Studies in Legal
Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre, and Berman, 29 RUTGERs L. REv. 73, 78-79 (1975)
(Court in Belle Terre "brushed aside" plaintiffs' arguments that zoning ordinances in-
fringed upon their fundamental rights). Belle Terre's expansive notion of "general wel-
fare" is directly descended from that found in Berman v. Parker, 848 U.S. 26, 88 (1954)
("The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.")
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), in which an ordinance restricting
the type of family members who could cohabit an apartment was narrowly struck down,
the plurality opinion argued that Euclid was not dispositive because the instant case
involved a violation of fundamental rights. Id. at 499 (Powell, J., announcing judgment
of the Court). Two dissenters, however, urged analysis in the presumptive style of Belle
Terre. Id. at 534-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Developments-Zoning, supra note 4, at
1569-74 (discussing Moore and Belle Terre).
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to review a California Supreme Court
decision that presented the issue whether zoning regulations alone could constitute a
taking of private property requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1979), cert. granted,
48 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1980) (No. 79-602). Both the final decision of the Supreme




volved in zoning issues: first, that zoning is a local problem properly
challenged in state courts or through the local "democratic process";
and second, that federal courts are less equipped than local forums to
solve zoning problems because of the minute complexities involved.52
This attitude has hindered nonresidents' efforts to employ federal
courts to challenge municipal zoning practices that have regional
ramifications. 53 Moreover, even in those cases in which relief has been
granted, the remedies authorized have been narrow in scope. Success-
ful cases have tended to involve requests for rezoning to permit the
development of a specific project, and the relief has been limited to
effecting this request. 54 Broader relief involving the whole of a mu-
nicipality's zoning scheme is avoided when the complaint alleges only
a particular wrong; yet challenges have less chance of success if they
are framed in broad terms requesting municipality-wide relief.55 Thus
52. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In tVarth the Court discussed both these
factors in determining whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue in federal court. The
Court stated that standing limitations are necessary so that it is not called upon to
decide questions better resolved by other governmental institutions. Id. at 500. Later the
Court noted that "zoning laws and their provisions, long considered essential to effective
urban planning, are peculiarly within the province of state and local legislative authori-
ties. . . . [C]itizens dissatisfied with provisions of such laws need not overlook the avail-
ability of the normal democratic process." Id. at 508 n.18.
Commentators have argued that these questions of competence and forum allocation
influenced the Court's application of standing doctrine in Warth. See, e.g., Sager, Insular
Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 91 HARV. L. Rxv. 1373, 1389-92 (1978) (refusal to grant standing as means of forum
allocation and of avoiding adjudication); Lamb & Lustig, The Burger Court, Exclusionary
Zoning, and the Activist-Restraint Debate, 40 U. Pirr. L. REv. 169, 220 (1979) (standing
doctrine "perverted" in pursuit of power allocation policy).
53. Standing to sue has been restricted to permit litigation on the part of only those
parties who can prove palpable injury from the municipal actions and to whom the
court believes a substantial probability of assistance will result from any relief awarded.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-64
(1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501, 504 (1975). But cf. Sager, supra note 52, at
1384 (proposition that plaintiff will actually secure improved housing if suit tied to
specific housing project rests upon faulty empirical premise); id. at 1386-88 (discussion of
same issue in context of Arlington Heights).
54. Narrow remedies are in part a result of the narrow focus of the issues that develops
from the restrictive standing requirements applied by the courts. See Lamb & Lustig, supra
note 52, at 215 ("[i]n narrowing the issue to a specific project, the Court precluded even
the most superficial attack on the loathesome effects of exclusionary zoning") (footnote
omitted). Examples illustrate the restricted nature of the relief granted. In Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978), the remedy granted was an injunction requiring the rezoning
of the specific plat for construction of the proposed project, but only if investigation were
to reveal that no other area within the municipality suitable for construction of that
project was already properly zoned for it. The remedy in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v.
City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971),
another successfully prosecuted challenge, was an order enjoining the city from further
interference with construction of the planned housing.
55. Because of the doubt whether the requested remedy will materially benefit plain-
tiffs, the standing hurdles are more difficult to overcome in such cases. ComPare Warth
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the major problems arising from improper zoning are rarely addressed,
and the attempted corrections are of limited effect.
2. The Traditional State Judicial Attitude
The failure of the federal courts to undertake a systematic in-
vestigation of municipal zoning leaves- resolution of these problems
to the state governments. This in turn raises the issue of which branch
of state government is most appropriate for such oversight. State courts
generally have not been innovative in dealing with zoning issues. The
perspective of these courts is usually limited such that only persons
demonstrating violation of property interests are granted standing,
and the effects of zoning upon nonresident parties with no direct
property interests are not considered. 56 In addition, when analyzing
state constitutional arguments, state courts have interpreted the delega-
tion of zoning power to the municipalities in the same manner as has
the federal judiciary.57
Also, because the zoning power is created and its limits established
by the legislature, and because the judiciary is felt to be less equipped
than the legislature to deal with zoning problems,5s the view has been
advanced by commentators and courts that the legislature is the proper
branch of government to regulate the use of the zoning power.5 9 State
court deference to the actions, or inaction, of the legislatures based
upon this reasoning is widespread.60
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing denied to nonresidents and to builders' association
in case requesting municipality-wide relief) with Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (standing granted for builder and non-
resident to challenge zoning ordinance affecting specific housing project).
56. Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local Zoning Decisions: Restricted
Access to State Courts and the Alternative Federal Forum, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 598, 598-99,
601-02 (1971).
57. See Comment, A Survey of the Judicial Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 22
SYRACUSE L. REv. 537, 538-62 (1971).
58. See pp. 762-63 infra.
59. See Sager, supra note 52, at 1411-12. The role of the judiciary vis-a-vis the legis.
lature in zoning was described by the New York Court of Appeals as follows:
Zoning... is essentially a legislative act.. .. To that end, we look to the Legisla-
ture . . . to foster the development of programs designed to achieve sound regional
planning. . . .Until the day comes when regional, rather than local, governmental
units can make such determinations, the courts must assess the reasonableness of what
the locality has done.
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672, 682 (1975); cf. Bowe, Regional Planning Versus Decentralized Land-Use Controls-
Zoning for the Megalopolis, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 144, 163 (1968) (questioning ability of
judiciary to apply recommendations); Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in
Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. Rv. 760, 763-66 (1976) (traditional judicial
approach one of deference to legislatures and local zoning bodies).
60. See Note, General Welfare and "No-Growth" Zoning Plans: Consideration of
Regional Needs by Local Authorities, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 215, 226-27 (1975).
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B. Recent State Innovations and Their Limitations
Significantly, some state governments recently have demonstrated an
increased awareness of the regional impact of municipal zoning ac-
tivities. In a few states, such as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and to a
lesser extent New York, the judicial attitude has shifted to a position
less deferential to municipal zoning actions.01 Cases challenging zoning
schemes have resulted in more thorough scrutiny of local activities in
the courts of these states, limiting the effectively unrestricted zoning
authority of municipalities. 2 These decisions have held that zoning
ordinances that severely restrict or ban the presence of certain uses or
lot sizes within a municipality-and thus restrict the entry of low-
income persons-for other than reasons of externalities or topography
3
violate the state constitutions or zoning enabling legislation.
61. Courts in other states have also, though somewhat erratically, spoken in this vein.
See, e.g., Hamelin v. Zoning Bd. of Wallingford, 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P.
1955) (zoning changes not arbitrary; aggrieved nonresidents, however, entitled to judicial
review of zoning decision); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516
(1942) (one-acre minimum for single-home lots not unreasonable; local interests must
yield, however, if conflict with general interests of public at large); Huttig v. City of
Richmond Heights, 372 S.V.2d 833 (Mo. 1963) (zoning ordinance as applied so unreason-
able as to violate due process; municipality must consider regional standpoint); Board
of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959)
(restrictive zoning amendment unconstitutional because unreasonable and unrelated to
welfare of area residents).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), has been seen as a source
for this line of argument, for the Court noted in dictum that given a case in which the
public interest clearly outweighed that of the municipality, the latter would not be
permitted to obstruct the former. Id. at 390.
62. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (developing municipalities must
consider effects of zoning activities upon regional general welfare); Berenson v. Town of
New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975) (municipality and
reviewing court must consider regional needs as well as municipality's own needs for
housing); Concord Township Appeal (Kit-Mar Builders), 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970)
(zoning township cannot disregard interests of entire area and must accommodate needs
of growing regional population).
For discussions of the innovations of these state courts, see Comment, supra note 57, at
564-74; Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and a Reluctant Supreme Court, 13 WAKE FoRmSr
L. REv. 107, 131-36 (1977).
63. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
186-87, 336 A.2d 713, 731, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); cf. National Land &
Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 525-31, 215 A.2d 597, 608-
12 (1965) (environmental arguments against zoning for increased housing development).
Although it is argued that neutral fiscal objectives may also permissibly support zoning
restrictions, some courts have been unwilling to approve such exclusionary manifestations.
Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville, 67 A.D.2d 70, 82-83,
414 N.Y.S.2d 573, 581 (1979); National Land 8- Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of
Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965). In Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
808 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that taxation and service considerations
are permissibly dealt with through zoning, provided that it is "'done reasonably'." 67
N.J. at 185, 336 A.2d at 731 (quoting Gruber v. Mayor of Raritan, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d
489 (1962)).
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey took an additional step in
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 4
holding that the state constitution and enabling legislation mandate
that municipalities consider the regional housing needs and regional
ramifications of zoning activities when they enact or amend ordi-
nances. 66 Local zoning authorities, therefore, have an affirmative duty
to broaden the range of housing and land uses that may be developed
within their jurisdiction. 7 The Mt. Laurel decision developed the
concept of "fair share" zoning, invoked by the New Jersey courts in
subsequent cases, 8 which requires developing municipalities to allocate
land for their estimated pro rata share of the uses-specifically low-
income housing-for which demand for new development far outstrips
land supply under current zoning schemes. 9
Few state courts have followed the innovative lead of Pennsylvania
and New Jersey in scrutinizing exclusionary practices.70 The reluctance
of most courts to confront the zoning issue is based at least in part upon
a realistic recognition of the substantial problems attending judicial
64. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
65. The decision was based upon the New Jersey equal protection and due process
clauses. 67 N.J. at 174-75, 336 A.2d at 725. One concurring judge argued that because the
case could have been resolved solely on the basis of the enabling legislation, reliance upon
the state constitutional provisions was unnecessary. 67 N.J. at 193, 336 A.2d at 735 (Moun-
tain, J., concurring).
66. The court stated:
[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a police power
of the state and the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that power and is
restricted in the same manner as is the state. So, when regulation does have a sub-
stantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the
particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served.
67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726; cf. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,
72 N.J. 481, 495, 371 A.2d 1192, 1198 (1977) (zoning municipalities must serve "general
welfare represented by satisfaction of the housing needs of lower income people through-
out the region").
67. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25; cf. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182,
189, 382 A.2d 105, 108 (1977) (local land use regulations must "meet the legitimate needs
of all categories of people who may desire to live within its boundaries").
68. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 553-54,
371 A.2d 1192, 1228 (1977); Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of
Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), Pet. for certification
denied; 74 N.J. 262 (1977).
69. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated only that each municipality must "bear its
fair share of the regional burden." 67 N.J. at 189, 336 A.2d at 733. This was applied as
a pro rata formulation in Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of Carteret,
142 N.J. Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), pet. for certification denied,
74 N.J. 262 (1977), in which the court required each municipality initially to zone for
low- and moderate-income housing so that the proportion of each town's population
represented by these income groups would equal that of the region as a whole. 142 N.J.
Super. at 36-37, 359 A.2d at 541. For a discussion of the method of pro rata allocation
adopted in this Note, see note 79 infra.
70. Sager, supra note 52, at 1400-01 & n.95; Comment, supra note 56, at 610.
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intervention in this area. The complex issues involved are not easily
confronted through the adjudicatory process, 71 and post-litigation re-
sults have been of questionable success.7 2 In addition, uniform state-
wide policy is not best developed by the judiciary, which can deal with
a given issue only in isolated cases.
These objections do not apply to the state legislatures, which are
capable of dealing with complex issues such as zoning in a more
comprehensive, uniform, and detailed manner.73 For example, some
state legislatures have enacted or amended their original enabling
legislation delegating the zoning power to require regional planning or
to require allocation within each municipality of a small amount of
land for specific uses.74 These legislative attempts, however, are not
fully responsive to the economic harms that flow from the improper
exercise of the zoning power. To this end, the following recommenda-
tion for legislative action is presented.
7 5
71. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515,
530-31 (1957); Note, supra note 59, at 766-86. Even the activist Supreme Court of New
Jersey observed,
[T]he governmental-sociological-economic enterprise of seeing to the provision and
allocation throughout appropriate regions of adequate and suitable housing for all
categories of the population is much more appropriately a legislative and administra-
tive function rather than a judicial function to be exercised in the disposition of
isolated cases.
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 534, 371 A.2d 1192, 1218
(1977) (footnote omitted). The court noted, however, that until the other branches of
government act effectively, the judiciary must deal with challenges to exclusionary zoning
as best it can. 72 N.J. at 535-36, 371 A.2d at 1219; cf. id. at 620-21, 371 A.2d at 1262
(Schreiber, J., concurring) (judicial remedy cannot eliminate system of taxation and
municipal finance that causes exclusion; only legislature can enact such relief).
72. Professor Sager has noted that even "successful" litigation can have only minimal
results in bringing about the development of new housing. Sager, supra note 52, at 1384-
85 nn. 40 & 41.
73. See Mytelka & Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Consideration of Remedies, 7
SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1975); Comment, State Police Power-Zoning-Validity of Local
Ordinance Depends on Considerations of Regional, Not Merely Local, General Welfare,
25 VAND. L. REv. 466, 473 (1972).
74. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1973 & Supp. 1978) (Michie/Law. Co-
op) (procedure facilitating development of low- and moderate-income housing); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-27-13 (1953) (purpose of zoning regulations to benefit inhabitants of
entire state). For a descriptive list of such legislation in New Jersey, see Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 189 n.22, 336 A.2d
713, 732 n.22, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
75. A difficulty arising from reliance upon state legislative action confronts those
regions (such as metropolitan New York City and Washington, D.C.) that include
municipalities in more than one state. These situations require cooperation among the
states in enacting proper legislation and determining the allocation of developable land
in the several communities. Such interstate cooperation in planning has occurred in a
few situations, such as the case of the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission. These
agreements might constitute interstate compacts, however, which require congressional
consent to be valid. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10; see United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
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III. A Legislative Proposal
To ensure economic efficiency in housing and land use develop-
ment, zoning legislation must serve two goals: first, it must guarantee
that within a region a sufficient amount of land is allocated for develop-
ment of uses for which demand exists; and second, these uses must be
distributed rationally among communities. To satisfy these require-
ments, state legislatures should amend the zoning enabling acts to
set more comprehensive guidelines for municipal zoning actions. First,
the general statement of policy must redefine the general welfare on
behalf of which zoning municipalities are required to act. The welfare
must be cast in terms of the whole region in which the municipality is
located." This would clarify that state policy requires municipalities
to make available the necessary amount of land for all uses within the
region, thus satisfying the first of the two zoning objectives.
With nothing more, however, this legislative action would allow
municipalities freely to determine what uses to restrict or ban because
they are thought to impose external costs upon present residents, pro-
vided that municipalities could demonstrate that land for the restricted
uses could be allocated at less social cost in other communities in the
region. This is unsatisfactory, for comparative measurement of the
negative external effects of a given use upon different areas within
a region is difficult, and no mechanism exists to reveal the actual costs
imposed by requiring municipalities to supply land for unwanted
uses. Thus, municipalities can present their preferences disingenuously,
overvaluing development of present uses and overestimating the costs
imposed by other uses. Reliance upon such presentations to satisfy the
76. In the states with zoning laws in statutory form, the new requirement could be
appended to the present law by an amendment. In those states that provide for the dele-
gation of the zoning power in the constitutions, the alteration would take one of two
forms. If there is no provision explicitly to the contrary, the alteration could be enacted
as part of the implementing statute specifying the zoning powers and activities of the
municipalities; no amendment of the state constitution would be necessary. If there
exists a constitutional provision that would be violated by a statutory attempt to require
regional considerations in zoning, then the change would have to be enacted through the
more cumbersome route of a constitutional amendment.
Other commentators have made similar recommendations. Some acknowledge that
zoning affects the areas beyond municipal boundaries and argue that this militates for
legislation requiring regional considerations in zoning. Bowe, supra note 59; Note, supra
note 60. Others argue for judicial action to the same effect. Comment, supra note 41;
Note, A Regional Perspective of the "General Welfare," 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1227
(1977). Still others base their conclusions on an entirely different line of reasoning, i.e.,
that because the municipalities zone under a delegation of state legislative power, they
must consider statewide needs and impact of their actions. Walsh, Are Local Zoning
Bodies Required by the Constitution to Consider Regional Needs? 3 CONN. L. RaV. 244
(1971).
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efficiency requirement would allow municipalities to supply less land
than is necessary to satisfy regional demand, and disingenuous restric-
tive communities could avoid the burden of developing such uses al-
together.
The concept of efficiency also includes distributional aspects that
can counteract this potential result. The desire for racial integration
and for redistribution of income can be conceived as a good that gives
utility to consumers and thus is includable, like any other good, in
every individual's utility function. 77 Each person gains satisfaction to
some extent, varying substantially among individuals, from efforts to
equalize differences in wealth, income, opportunities, or other factors,
and from the knowledge that these efforts are undertaken by society.
This aspect of utility is evidenced, for example, by recent movements
to integrate the housing market, to establish affirmative action pro-
grams in higher education and employment, and to amend the method
of public school financing to guarantee greater equality of funding
among school systems.
73
Including this variable in consumers' utility functions requires ex-
pansion of the efficiency criterion to include distributional considera-
tions. Exact empirical determination of the optimal mix of uses to
satisfy the distributional aspect of the efficiency criterion would be
difficult, and therefore no rigid rule should be established. The follow-
ing two-step approach to the problem of allocating land presents a
compromise solution that balances the concerns of distribution with
other efficiency considerations.
A. "Fair Share" Allocation
As a first step, the regional demand for those uses for which in-
sufficient land is allocated should be estimated and the necessary land
77. For a discussion of distribution as a criterion for efficiency, see Hochman &
Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. EcoN. Rav. 542 (1969). They note:
Given interdependence among individual utility functions, it is possible that some
redistribution will make everyone better off. Efficiency criteria can be applied, there-
fore, to redistribution of income through the fiscal process. . . . Both allocation and
redistribution can be dealt with in terms of the same methodology and the same
criterion-efficiency. Then it can be argued that the distributive goal of vertical
equity is contained within the Paretian concept of efficiency.
Id. at 543 (footnotes omitted).
78. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979) (affirma-
tive action on-the-job training program held not violative of equal protection); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (challenge of medical school's affirmative
action program); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (public school
financing through local property taxes with no regard for differential among municipali-
ties' fiscal status unconstitutional); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1979) (forbidding racial discrimination in sale or rental of dwellings).
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apportioned pro rata among all the municipalities in the region.70
This will ensure that sufficient land for each use is made available
and that the burden of supplying the land is widely distributed.80 The
initial estimate would include projections of future regional develop-
ment and of the demand for various uses for a given number of years.
Developed communities as well as developing suburbs would be in-
cluded in the allocation process8' and would be required to rezone
79. For example, if the projected development of the region were to require that X%.
of its land be made available for a given use, then each community would allocate X% of
its total land for development of that use. The pro rata allocation of uses is based upon
the amount of land within the borders of each municipality. Land, rather than some
other factor such as population, is used as the criterion because use of the former has a
greater redistributive effect. Were the allocation related to population or population
density, for example, then substantial development of the unwanted uses would be
required in the most highly populated areas, while undeveloped communities or those
that already successfully zoned to restrict growth would face minimal allocations of the
unwanted uses. One commentary, in interpreting Mt. Laurel, bases the pro rata allocation
upon the income distribution of the inhabitants of the region. Thus if X% of the regional
population has income level Y, then each municipality must zone so that X% of its in-
habitants will have income level Y. Inman & Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local
Fiscal Equity, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1662, 1718-19 (1979). This is very similar in application to
the proposal in this Note.
80. The required "fair share" allocation would be applicable only to those uses, most
prominently low-income housing, that municipalities do not desire to develop within
their jurisdictions. The public goods aspect of the housing market, allowing municipalities
to supply too little land for development of the use to satisfy demand, is most acute for
these uses. For the uses that municipalities find desirable, such as large-lot housing,
municipalities will not restrict development and the market will allocate sufficient
amounts of land to meet demand. Thus no required "fair share" allocation of land for
these uses is necessary. The preexisting allocation for such uses might, in fact, be reduced
to permit increased zoning for the uses required under the "fair share" plan.
Scattered distribution of some uses, such as heavy industry, that impose obvious physical
externalities or that gain obvious benefits when located in specific topographic situations,
would be inefficient. An argument might be made that such uses should be excepted from
the regional "fair share" allocation plan, rather than force municipalities to rely upon
the market mechanism, presented at pp. 767-68 infra, with its attendant transaction costs,
to reduce the resulting inefficiencies. Two considerations, however, militate for inclusion
of these uses in the proposed scheme. First, no brightline exists to distinguish these uses
from those that impose external costs only according to the idiosyncratic calculations of
certain restrictive municipalities. Second, inclusion of uses obviously imposing externalities
would encourage municipalities to accept the proposed trading mechanism and to use
it in other situations as well, which might not occur if it were to be utilized only in
difficult cases. In the longrun this would facilitate trading to attain an efficient regional
distribution of uses.
81. In this way the proposal differs from the actions of the New Jersey courts, which
placed the burden of supplying land to meet regional demand upon developing com-
munities. See, e.g., Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977)
(Mt. Laurel does not apply to small town, only 2.3%o of whose land still undeveloped);
cf. Developments-Zoning, supra note 4, at 1654-56 (discussing desirability of requiring
developed communities to provide land for special uses). The proposal is less harsh upon
developing communities than are the decisions of the New Jersey courts, but it presents
more of a challenge to the status quo in developed communities. Thus the proposal
presents a more balanced technique for spreading the burden of supplying land for un-
wanted uses throughout a given region. For a discussion of the impropriety of requiring
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those areas still vacant or being redeveloped if their present zoning
scheme fell short of their pro rata share. 2
The initial allocation, however, would not complete the process. In
later years, should the initial estimation be found to be inaccurate or
should demand for a given use outrun supply, a new allocation would
be required, apportioning among all municipalities the amount of land
necessary to absorb the additional demand. In the years of growing
demand the region itself will have expanded so that a greater number
of municipalities can take part in the allocation of regional land
resources.
B. Transfer of Zoning Allocations
This "fair share" allocation, however, should not be the final step,
for it would not account for the legitimate zoning objective of limiting
externalities. After the initial "fair share" allocation, municipalities
should be permitted to trade or sell development rights to others in
the region, so that those uses causing negative externalities in one
area could be transferred to areas in which their development would
be more efficient.8 3 This transfer would result in the segregation of
uses only to the extent that it limited negative externalities and re-
flected municipal preferences. Rather than permit each jurisdiction
simply to state that a given use imposed greater costs upon it than
upon other municipalities, the trade mechanism would allow it to ban
that use from its borders only if it could find other municipalities in
which development of the use was considered less costly.8 4 Thus a
only developing communities to satisfy the low-income housing needs of the entire
region, written in anticipation of the Pascack decision, see Buchsbaum, The Irrelevance of
the "Developing Municipality" Concept-A Reply to Professors Rose and Levin, 5 REAL
ESTATE L.J. 280 (1977).
82. If fully developed or not willing to disrupt the community character, a municipality
can reduce the redistributive effects of this proposal by using the trading mechanism
proposed below.
83. This is similar to the concept of private transferable development rights, instituted
in some localities, such as midtown Manhattan. See LAND USE CONTROL, suPra note 37,
at 129-59.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel acknowledged that circumstances might
require relaxation of the strict fair share rule. Relevant considerations include topo-
graphic or environmental concerns, 67 N.J. at 186-87, 336 A.2d at 731, although the
problems must be "substantial and very real." Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731. The proposal
developed in this Note requires no such proof of substantiality of effect, so long as
municipalities wishing to avoid development of given uses find other communities in the
region willing to accept them.
84. Substantial transaction and information costs will be involved when the various
municipalities in a region attempt to trade or purchase development allocations among
themselves. To facilitate the functioning of this market, the state legislature should ap-
point a "broker" for each region to gather and disseminate information and to catalyze
prospective deals between municipalities.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 748, 1980
municipality could refuse to develop a use only by transferring it to
another municipality in exchange for another use it found less burden-
some, or by paying to the transferee municipality a lump sum as a
"purchase" of the right not to develop the unwanted use and to reim-
burse the transferee for accepting the use that imposed external costs
upon it.85
The process would encourage efficient allocation of resources by
permitting municipalities to restrict the development of uses within
their borders that imposed negative externalities upon their residents.
The municipalities could not simply claim that unwanted uses caused
externalities, however, and thereby totally avoid the burden of assist-
ing the development of such uses within the region. The transfer step
of the proposal would require municipalities to locate other com-
munities in which the unwanted uses are acceptable at lower cost and
to assist in the development of those uses in other communities. Thus
the proposal would help solve the problems of insufficient supply of
land for undesirable uses and of restrictive communities functioning as
free riders upon less restrictive municipalities in the region. s6
85. This formulation does permit inclusion of objectionable considerations, such as
race and income level, in the definition of externalities because of the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing the external effect of these considerations from the effects of other ex-
ternalities. The proposal, however, counteracts this by requiring municipalities either to
allocate land for these uses according to the fair share plan despite the external effects,
or to transfer the duty to develop such uses to other communities with a lump sum
payment or acceptance of development of other uses traded from the transferee com-
munity. This is a significant improvement over present law, which permits a municipality
to restrict the development of a use within its borders, claiming that it imposes costs upon
present residents, without considering the regional need for its development or assisting
its development elsewhere.
86. These problems are discussed at p. 754 & p. 756 supra.
The feasibility of passage of this zoning proposal is an important issue. The recom-
mendation reduces the freedom of municipalities to zone on their own behalf and might
therefore be received with hostility in legislatures dominated by suburban representatives.
Several factors, however, mitigate this unfavorable view. First, the legislatures of some
states with large suburban populations, such as Massachusetts and New Jersey, already
have passed laws restricting municipal zoning power, demonstrating that voting strength
alone is not an insurmountable obstacle. Second, in states with other groups strongly
represented in the legislature that have interests in amending the zoning law, coalitions
can be formed to overcome the voting strength of recalcitrant suburban representatives.
In addition, the proposal need not be regarded with hostility by all suburban groups.
The fair share allocation should satisfy those municipalities that have been slow to zone
restrictively and that thus are bearing the burden of the restrictive policies of neighboring
communities. The allocation of the duty to zone for specific uses among all the mu-
nicipalities in the region would alleviate the fears of developing communities that they
would be required to shoulder the burden of supplying all the land necessary for develop-
ment of uses not wanted elsewhere. Also, since regional allocation would not greatly dis-
rupt any individual community, opposition might be lessened. Finally, of course, the
strict redistributive effects of this rule are ameliorated by the trading step that permits
municipalities to limit the costs incurred from negative externalities.
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